States, which argued for a more flexible regime -the continuity scenario -with scope for Member States to designate their own assisted areas. The continuity scenario ultimately prevailed, so that the rules adopted for 2007-13 bear greater resemblance to those in place for 2000-6 than to the Commission's initial reform proposals. 1 Across the EU25 around €800 million of this is regional aid (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005a) . However, this figure significantly underplays true levels of regional aid expenditure because it excludes Structural Fund cofinancing of national expenditures and because regional aid for small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) is classed as SME aid, rather than regional aid. Nevertheless, it is clear that regional aid remains a significant category of expenditure for many countries. Importantly, Structural Funds spending is also subject to the state aid rules.
The use of state aids in economic development policy is controversial. Domestically, debates tend to centre on whether subsidies are efficient or effective ways of addressing market failure, market imperfections or permanent geographical handicaps and whether policy should seek instead to improve the general business environment and reduce corporate taxation. This debate is beyond the scope of this article which deals with the regulation of state aids at the European level; this is not fundamentally 
Basic principles of state aid control
Under the Treaty of Rome (1957) the control of government subsidies was viewed as essential to the internal market: as quotas and tariffs were being outlawed, the temptation for governments to resort to other forms of protectionism was considered likely to increase. Initially Commission action was tentative, but the last two decades have seen state aid control rise up the agenda, culminating in the 2005-9 State Aid Action Plan -SAAP (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005b) a 'roadmap' for reform.
Moreover, as Commission confidence has increased, so has the scope of state aid control. Not only do the rules apply to all publicly-funded intervention, but they also impinge on activities as diverse as urban regeneration, broadband access, public private partnerships, credit unions and infrastructure provision; they are not limited to regulating aid for mobile projects or state-owned companies.
The underlying principle of the EC Treaty provisions is that state aids are prohibited (Article 87(1)). However, the ban is not absolute. There are some mandatory exceptions, 2 but more importantly, a number of discretionary exceptions are outlined in Article 87(3); their interpretation is the exclusive competence of the European Commission. Crucially, plans to offer state aid (whether ad hoc or as an aid scheme) must be notified to the Commission and approved by it before implementation; 3 unauthorised aid is illegal and may have to be repaid. The core of Commission policy on regional aids is its interpretation of Article 87(3)(a) and (c), which enable regional aids to be exempted from the general ban.
Article 87(3)(a) concerns "regions where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment" (referred to as 'a' regions); Article 87(3)(c)
covers "aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest" (referred to as 'c' areas).
The differences between the two provisions are important and have increasingly affected how the Commission authorises aid area maps, the types of aid allowed and the aid values permitted. This flows from a European Court of Justice ruling in the late 1980s that 'a' areas were disadvantaged in relation to the Community as a whole;
in contrast, it held that 'c' areas were those disadvantaged in relation to the national average.
4
Following this judgement, and partly as a consequence of the 1988 Structural Funds reform, the Commission began to make explicit reference to 'a' and 'c' areas in approving regional aid schemes and maps (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1988a) ; until then, the Commission had been lax in so doing, and its decision-making generally lacked transparency.
Since 1988 the definition of 'a' regions has become entrenched in regional aid control policy and applied increasingly strictly. The 'a' regions are those where GDP per head is less than 75 percent of the Community average. 5 For its part, the definition of 'c' areas has been much more fluid and, partly as a result, much more controversial. Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 about here]
The selection of the 'c' areas within the population quotas was a national responsibility, but the area designation methodology was severely constrained by the Guidelines. Moreover, map proposals were closely scrutinised by the Commission and, following protracted negotiations, many had to be amended before the Commission would approve them.
The 1998 guidelines also imposed lower aid ceilings. As before, aid maxima reflected the severity of the regional problem; typically, these ranged from 20 per cent to 50 per cent of eligible investment, compared with up to 30 per cent and 75 per cent before 2000.
7
Historically, regional aid control has used guidelines within which aid schemes can be authorised, obviating the need for case-by-case analysis of awards to firms. From a competition distortion perspective, the downside of this approach was that it sheltered thousands of awards from scrutiny of their competition and trade effects. Within the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 COMMISSION, 2002b) . This systematically reduced aid rates available to all projects involving eligible expenditure exceeding €50 million. Moreover, the Commission had to individually approve aid for investments of more than €100 million where the aid proposed exceeded a specified amount. In these individual cases aid would not be authorised if it reinforced a high market share or increased capacity in a stagnant sector; the onus was on the Member
State to demonstrate that this was not so.
EVOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL AID GUIDELINES 2007-13
For several reasons the 2000-6 Guidelines could not simply be rolled forward for 2007-13. In particular, the impact of the 2004 enlargement on average EU GDP per head had implications for 'a' region eligibility and Member States lobbied intensively for special treatment of the affected regions; the Commission was sympathetic, but had to reconcile this with its desire to maintain overall discipline. In addition, a legal challenge to the Commission Decision on the German regional aid map had resulted in criticism of the 1998 Guidelines; the Commission could not ignore these observations. Also, there was widespread resentment among EU15 Member States at the impact of the 1998 Guidelines; privately some Commission officials admitted that 
Genesis of a reform
Early signs that radical change might be countenanced were contained in a The concentration scenario involved allowing regional aid only in 'a' regions and in 'c' areas selected by the Commission ('earmarked' areas). The continuity scenario was built on a simplification of the 2000-6 approach; in addition to the 'a' regions and earmarked 'c' areas, further 'c' areas could be designated by the Member States, subject to an overall ceiling of the EU25 population.
The Director General argued that the concentration scenario would be simpler and better satisfy the four considerations and constraints on DG Competition's agenda, namely: the objective of 'less and better aid'; the need to reconcile the reduction in (Table 2 ). These reductions were unevenly distributed: there would be no aid area coverage in Cyprus, Denmark, mainland France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; several countries, including the UK, would see cutbacks of more than 50 per cent; elsewhere there would be more modest reductions or coverage would be unchanged.
[ Table 2 about here]
There were also significant implications for maximum award rates. Direct comparisons are difficult but, by way of example, a region where the maximum was 50 per cent net would probably have a new maximum of 30 per cent gross -less than half the previous value.
Finally, the proposals referred to possible new 'significant impact test' instruments, which would partially compensate for the loss of aid area status by offering greater flexibility for 'non-significant' aid in all areas. The proposed frameworks on lesser amounts of state aid (LASA) and aid with a limited effect on trade (LET) were an Table 3 -non-earmarked 'c' areas). The outcome is a return to the situation where every Member State not entirely covered by 'a' status has a population quota for 'c' areas with eligibility determined by the national authorities. The national 'c' population quotas are, as in the 1998 Guidelines, based on internal disparities in GDP and unemployment adjusted to reflect the EU context, but a 'safety net' provision limits losses to 50 per cent of 2006 coverage and modest transitional arrangements apply.
[ Table 3 about here]
As Table 3 shows, the addition of non-earmarked 'c' areas means there were no 'losers' from the continuity scenario, compared with the concentration scenario proposals. However, the gains for some countries were non-existent or very modest:
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden see small increases and coverage is unchanged for all the new Member States except Cyprus. By contrast, for Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK aid area population coverage is increased by between 10 and 50 percentage points. In no case is coverage for 2007-13
higher than for 2000-6 (compare Tables 1 and 3) .
SATISFYING THE CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS
The evolution of the 2006 Guidelines is the road from DG Competition's (preferred) concentration scenario to the continuity scenario. Opinion is divided among national policymakers as to whether this was a deliberate negotiating strategy. It could be argued that presenting such a radical proposal at the start essentially 'softened them In short, the concentration scenario only delivers 'less and better aid' to the extent that cohesion policy is synonymous with targeting 'a' regions. This narrow interpretation which has emerged in recent policy statements is questionable; it limits the scope for
Member States to tackle "disparities between the levels of development of the various regions" as required by the Treaty.
Reconciling lower state aid volumes with cohesion in an enlarged EU
The 'less and better' objective is closely related to the aim of reconciling lower state aid spending with cohesion. The Director General of DG Competition argued that the concentration scenario would deliver better on this because the elimination of almost all 'c' areas would itself reduce state aid spending. Moreover, within the 'a' regions, aid would not only be more effective but rates of award could be lowered (further reducing spending) because of the absence of rate competition from 'c' areas (LOWE 2003a).
[ Table 4 about here] In addition, the scope for 'c' areas to be designated by the Member States was introduced, with maximum award rates of 10 to 15 per cent of investment. Last, special provisions were introduced to limit the aid rate differentials between regions in neighbouring countries.
The adoption of the continuity scenario will certainly result in higher spending in 'c' areas, although data constraints and the 'unknown' of future policy designs make it impossible to estimate the scale of such spending. Moreover, the maintenance of more extensive 'c' areas clearly erodes the rate differential between 'a' regions and other parts of the EU. However, this does not mean that the continuity scenario fails to reconcile cohesion objectives with reduced spending. In practice, this depends, as noted earlier, on the interpretation of 'cohesion' -is the consideration of cohesion from a Commission or Member State perspective? In addition, favouring the concentration scenario presupposes an understanding of the impact of award rate differentials and an ability to calibrate these to reflect policy objectives. There is no evidence of this. Historically, the Commission has rather arbitrarily set award ceilings broadly in line with its perception of the regional problem, mainly using GDP per head. The resulting pattern of rates and rate differentials bears no direct relationship to that which would influence location decisions (which in turn would be likely to vary between project types and sectors). More generally, the focus on aid differentials is only reasonable if it is assumed that regional policy is solely a means of diverting jobs and investment between regions (ARMSTRONG, 1984). 
Experience with the 1998 regional aid Guidelines
The last consideration concerns practical constraints. There was considerable frustration and resentment among national policymakers at the detailed involvement of Commission officials in the selection of aid areas in 1999 -2000 (WISHLADE, 2003 ; and many acknowledged that they would not wish to repeat the process. In addition, the 1998 Guidelines were criticised in litigation brought by Germany against a Commission Decision on the German aid map. 14 This action was not successful, but the Advocate General questioned the methodology for allocating 'c' area population quotas between countries and concluded that it breached the principle of equal treatment. Undoubtedly, the concentration scenario would have responded more simply to the issues raised by the 1998 Guidelines, but it is important not to confuse simplicity with even-handedness. As the adoption of the continuity scenario has shown, the criticisms made by the Advocate General were not insurmountable and the more straightforward area designation framework under the 2006 Guidelines suggests that there were ways to avoid excessively detailed map negotiations.
WIDER POLICY ISSUES
This paper has argued that the case for the concentration scenario was self-fulfilling:
the concentration scenario only delivers better on DG Competition's constraints and considerations to the extent that a restrictive interpretation of 'cohesion' is adopted.
Moreover, the choice presented was false: because both scenarios focused on spatial coverage, neither had the capacity, in itself, to address the key issues of 'better aid' or competition distortion.
The debate surrounding the reform of the regional aid Guidelines was contrived as a choice between options for spatial coverage, based on a narrow view of 'cohesion' -targeting the 'a' regions. The limited focus of the reform options meant that wider questions about the relationship between national and EU regional policies and the ways in which cohesion, competition and competitiveness are promoted were not really addressed in the debate. The discussion that follows seeks to open up some of A missed opportunity to decouple national and EU regional policies?
The new Guidelines are a U-turn in the Commission's original position, but the spatial coverage of national regional policies will still be driven by EU Cohesion policy objectives; areas holding less than 8 per cent of the EU25 population are designated on the basis of national priorities. The preoccupation with spatial coverage, combined with the use of EU cohesion criteria, has implications for subsidiarity and the capacity of Member States to design and conduct spatially-differentiated policies.
There have long been direct links between the control of Member State regional policies and the emergence of a bespoke Community regional policy. Early observers stressed the importance of Community-level controls over national regional aid as a partial substitute for a common regional policy (DEACON, 1982) and from the late 1980s it became standard Commission rhetoric to promote regional aid control as an aspect of cohesion policy (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1988b) . As the two policies became more closely intertwined, issues of policy coherence, primarily expressed in terms of the extent to which the national and the EU assisted areas maps coincide, gained prominence (WISHLADE, 2003) . BESLEY and SEABRIGHT (1999) , among others, argued that there was no justification for seeking to ensure map coincidence;
while VANHOVE (2000) has taken the opposite view.
The reform of cohesion policy against the backdrop of enlargement created an opportunity for a fundamental reappraisal of the targeting and coordination of EU and Member States' regional policies. In spite of some prompts (e.g. the SAPIR report (2003) and the UK regional policy White Paper (HM TREASURY et al., 2003) ) the 
A blunt instrument for addressing competition distortion
An important strand of the state aid reform agenda is the focus on the most distortive aids. This has partly been driven by the administrative implications of enlargement and concerns at the disproportionate resources involved in the scrutiny of measures raising few competition concerns.
Neither of the scenarios proposed addresses the issue of distortion head-on; in line with long-standing trends, the emphasis of the proposals was on the spatial coverage of policy rather than on the competitive effects of aid. As long as 20 years ago, the Commission itself acknowledged that: "area and population coverage provide a better indication of Member States' regional policy than of the impact of schemes on competition" (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1986, point 229) .
The main scope for competition distortion to be addressed directly lies in the Multisectoral Framework, now brought within the regional aid Guidelines. For most projects, the MSF rules are substantially unchanged. However, because maximum award values are reduced under the Guidelines, the aid rates available to investments exceeding €50 million also fall, as does the aid threshold beyond which projects must "the Commission will approve regional investment aid only after detailed verification... …that the aid is necessary to provide an incentive effect and that the benefits of the aid measure outweigh the resulting distorting of competition and effect on trade between Member States" (para 68)
It is not yet clear quite how this will be operationalised: the criteria to be taken into account in making this assessment will be the subject of further guidance (footnote 63). Nevertheless, the abandonment of LASA and LET and, for now, of a sectoral 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 It remains to be seen how the Commission will address this issue, but for now there is no mechanism to deal a situation in which a single EU location is competing with non-EU alternatives. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
An emerging policy vacuum?
A key feature of a number of the existing horizontal aid frameworks is that projects in designated problem regions may benefit from higher rates of award or more flexible conditions. The loss of 'a' or 'c' area status therefore involves the loss of these benefits under the existing horizontal frameworks. The SAAP confirms that many of these horizontal frameworks will be revised and consultations have raised the issue of whether special treatment of disadvantaged areas under horizontal frameworks is justified. Moreover, even where more generous terms are available in the problem On the one hand, the competitiveness agenda promotes horizontal policies (most obviously for R&D) that favour the development of all regions, but using policy instruments where the impact and uptake is likely to be higher in the more prosperous regions, especially under demand-led national schemes; on the other hand, EU Cohesion and regional aid control policies target assistance at the least-prosperous regions. Unless regional policymakers can influence their horizontal policy counterparts, the net effect of this may be to create a policy vacuum for those regions that are neither well-placed to benefit from policies focused on innovation or other horizontal priorities, nor sufficiently disadvantaged to qualify for regional aid, either at the national or Community levels. 7 Expressed in net grant-equivalent (NGE). This refers to the after-tax value of assistance and until 2006 was used by the Commission for comparing the value of all forms of regional aid.
8 For a small number of industries special aid rules applied, notably: coal and steel, shipbuilding, synthetic fibres and motor vehicles. 9 This has never been published but was kindly provided to the author by several national regional policymakers.
10 Guyane, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, Madeira, Azores and Canaries. This is not binding, but in this case it was followed. 16 This being the amount of aid that a €100 million project could receive in the area concerned, so that the threshold is in effect raised in higher rate regions. For a €500 million project the rate at which aid is notifiable is 2.25 per cent of eligible expenditure in a 15 per cent rate region and 4.5 per cent in a 30 per cent rate region.
17 Member States have long been obliged to provide annual reports detailing the major aid beneficiaries. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
